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exeCutive summary

W

hile increasing attention is being paid to the drivers and forms of
entrepreneurship in informal economies, much less of this policy
and research focus is directed at understanding the links between mobility
and informality. This report examines the current state of knowledge about
this relationship with particular reference to three countries (Mozambique,
South Africa and Zimbabwe) and four cities (Cape Town, Harare, Johannesburg and Maputo), identifying major themes, knowledge gaps, research
questions and policy implications. In many African cities, informal enterprises are operated by internal and international migrants. The extent and
nature of mobile entrepreneurship and the opportunities and challenges
confronting migrant entrepreneurs are under-researched in Africa in general and Southern Africa in particular. Their contribution to the informal
economy and employment generation in countries of destination and origin
are similarly undervalued by policy-makers. Informal migrant entrepreneurs
are often viewed with suspicion, if not hostility, by citizens and officials. In
part, this is because central and municipal governments see them as increasing the growth of an informal sector that they want tamed, if not eradicated.
Also, it is because they are often incorrectly seen as all “illegal immigrants”
and, by definition, engaged in illicit activities. And, in countries with high
levels of xenophobia such as South Africa, migrant-owned businesses are a
visible and easy target for xenophobic attacks. Violent attacks on migrant
entrepreneurs and their property have become extremely common in many
South African cities.
South Africa’s relatively small informal sector is accompanied by very
high unemployment levels. Many commentators therefore feel that the
South African informal economy ought to be much larger than it is. Given
the apartheid-era repression of informal entrepreneurship, the key question
may not be why the informal economy is not larger, but why, after decades
of repression, it is as large and important as it is. One of the reasons is
that the informal economy is not just populated by South African citizens.
Migrants from other African countries play an increasingly important role
in the sector and experience considerable success, something that eludes
many locally-owned start-ups. Informal retailing has been the major focus
of economic research on different sub-sectors of the informal economy.
Particularly common are small-area case studies of survivalist street trading
(particularly of food and handicrafts) in the inner city. The spaza shop sector in low-income residential areas has also been studied. Other informal
entrepreneurial activities that have attracted attention include the minibus
taxi industry, waste collection and recycling, shebeens, trade in medicinal
plants and poverty tourism.
As well as documenting the economic challenges of informality, the
existing literature on the South African informal economy raises two other
1
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important issues that have a bearing on the environment for entrepreneurship. The first is the relationship between formal and informal retail. The
central research question is whether the rapid expansion of malls and
supermarkets across the South African urban landscape, and their recent
penetration of low-income areas, is having a negative impact on the informal economy. The second issue concerns the formalization of informal
businesses, partially due to the ILO’s 2014-15 standard-setting process on
“Formalizing the Informal Economy.” For reasons including greater legal
control, collection of taxes and registration fees, enforcement of labour legislation and identification and deportation of irregular migrants, the South
African authorities would like to see the informal economy subject to formal
rules and regulations. In South Africa, the drive towards formalization has
progressed furthest in the taxi industry but many sectors of the informal
economy remain outside the regulatory fold. Most informal entrepreneurs
are opposed to formalization, stressing the financial costs and constraints on
business flexibility.
The Zimbabwean experience raises important questions about the links
between the collapse of the formal economy and the growth of informality.
At independence in 1980, Zimbabwe’s urban informal economy was small,
absorbing about 10% of the labour force. By 2003, it accounted for over
70% of the labour force and its contribution to gross national income (GNI)
had grown to around 60%. In 2011, 84% of the workforce were in informal
employment. The largest number were in retail and wholesale trade followed by repair of motor vehicles and cycles, services and manufacturing.
Women constituted 53% of those in informal employment. There have been
few studies of the impact of state failure on the urban informal economy.
Yet, under conditions of economic crisis, participation in more lucrative
income-generating activities in the informal sector becomes essential and
there are strong indications that the collapse of the economy actually had
a positive impact on Zimbabweans’ entrepreneurial motivations and skills.
Mozambique represents a different scenario in terms of the links between
informal entrepreneurship and formal economic growth. The Mozambican
economy was virtually destroyed by the civil war in the 1980s and the vast
majority of urban residents managed to survive through the informal economy. In the last two decades, Mozambique has had one of the fastest-growing
formal economies in Africa. Yet, the informal economy has proven to be
extremely resilient. A 2005 survey concluded that 75% of the economicallyactive population was employed informally in Mozambique. Another survey
of Maputo found that 70% of the city’s households are involved in informal
economic activities and about 65% of jobs are in the informal economy.
Although research on the informal economy is not as extensive as in Zimbabwe or South African cities, several studies have highlighted the dynamism
and heterogeneity of the sector and the role of informal entrepreneurship in
2
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poverty reduction. The most common type of informal economic activity is
the sale of foodstuffs and petty commodities.
Mobility is essential to the urban informal economy in Southern African
cities. Within urban areas, mobility is a vital component of the business
strategies of informal operatives who identify spaces with niche markets or
a relative absence of the formal sector. While some businesses operate from
fixed sites, others use different parts of the city on different days or at different times of a single day. Many participants in the informal economy are
internal or international migrants, often in competition with one another
for the same market share. Although the numbers of international migrants
are frequently exaggerated, it is clear that they have played an increasingly
important role in the informal economies of Southern African cities over
the last two decades and have reshaped the nature of informality and informal entrepreneurship in the region. Yet the importance of that role is often
underestimated, invisible to researchers and denigrated by policy-makers.
Recent studies of migrant entrepreneurship in South Africa focus on
several key issues:
neurs;
capital, cost-saving strategies such as shared shop spaces, revenueboosting strategies such as bulk buying, and material support such as
accommodation for newly-arrived migrants;
a constant threat to migrant business activity;
owners;
activity; and
neurship.
Migrants are often more entrepreneurial than most, yet the constraints
they face in establishing and growing their businesses are considerable.
Their general contribution to employment creation and inclusive growth
is undervalued and often misrepresented as a threat. Foreign migrants in
the South African informal economy do have considerable entrepreneurial
ambition but are severely hampered in growing their enterprises by obstacles
including:
and conditions of entry and the ability to move along migration corridors
between countries;
cial and support services;
3
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deportation disrupting business activity;
refused bank accounts and loans);
sector, and hostile and xenophobic local attitudes.
Violent attacks on the persons and properties of migrant business operations – whether motivated by rivalry, criminality or xenophobia or a combination of these – are regular and frequent and involve considerable loss of
property and life.
In terms of economic challenges confronting informal-sector entrepreneurs, both South African and migrant, a major issue is the lack of access
to financial services including start-up capital and ongoing credit. Formal
financial institutions are extremely reluctant to do business with migrant
informal entrepreneurs. As a result, many rely on various financial bootstrapping alternatives to minimize their capital outlay and running costs.
Despite these financial challenges, there is evidence of upward mobility
of migrant-owned businesses in terms of the growth of business capital. A
central premise of the hostility towards foreign migrants in South Africa is
that they “steal” jobs from South Africans. However, the studies reviewed
in this report suggest the opposite. Migrant entrepreneurs certainly create
employment opportunities for other migrants but they also hire many South
Africans. More research is needed, however, on why migrant entrepreneurs
employ South Africans and under what conditions. The essence of an
inclusive-growth perspective on informality is that the sector should create
“decent” jobs. Whether or not the jobs created deserve this label has yet to
be established.
Among the most common manifestations of mobile informality in Southern Africa are the inter-urban linkages across international boundaries.
When it comes to relations between South Africa, Mozambique and Zimbabwe, most of this business is conducted by individuals travelling overland
and engaged in so-called ICBT (informal cross-border trade). ICBT plays
a vital, though largely unrecognized, role in regional economic integration
and in linking informal economies in different SADC cities. Informal traders need to be seen as entrepreneurs and their activities as a potentially
strong promoter of inclusive growth and employment creation across the
region. In Mozambique and Zimbabwe, a sizeable number of informal entrepreneurs are international migrants. They establish their businesses in their
home cities, such as Maputo and Harare, and grow them by taking advantage of the opportunities provided by cross-border economic linkages and
migration. Informal cross-border traders, many of them women, thus play
a critical role in the circulation of formally and informally produced goods
throughout the SADC region.
4
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A related aspect of the relationship between migration and informal
entrepreneurship is the massive flow of cash remittances and goods that
migrants in Johannesburg and Cape Town send to Mozambique and Zimbabwe, including the cities of Maputo and Harare. The use of formal channels
for remittance transfers is very limited in both Mozambique and Zimbabwe.
The business opportunities for small-scale entrepreneurs in the remittances
industry are largely in the channels through which remittances of cash and
goods are sent home by migrants. Informal transport operators called the
Omalayisha move cash, people and consumer goods between Zimbabwe and
South Africa, for example.
Gender issues are of particular relevance in understanding the nature
of informal enterprise in Southern African cities. Cross-border migration
has always been highly gendered in the region. The feminization of migration is well under way with the numbers and proportion of female migrants
to South Africa increasing rapidly. Unable to obtain work permits, many
women are hired as irregular migrants, which heightens their vulnerability.
Others are forced into survivalist activities in the urban informal economy.
In both Harare and Maputo, gender-based tussles characterize the informal
economy. The collapse of the formal economy pushed many more men into
the sector and made the highly competitive informal business environment
a site of new conflict. Cross-border trade between Zimbabwe, Mozambique
and South Africa was initially dominated by women but high rates of
unemployment amongst men have prompted them to move into the trade,
leading to growing gender conflict over control of sectors of the trade and
the proceeds of trade.
These gender-based issues can be reformulated as a set of key research
questions: (a) does the feminization of migration impact on the nature of
participation of women in the informal economy, are there gender differences in the types and opportunities for involvement of men and women
in informal entrepreneurship and does small business development offer
women (and especially women-headed households) a way out of urban
poverty? (b) what kinds of challenges affect migrant female and not male
entrepreneurs and what strategies do they adopt to establish and grow
their businesses? (c) how do intra-household gender roles and expectations
impact on the ability of women to establish and grow their informal enterprises? and (d) are national and local policies on migration and the informal
economy disadvantageous to female entrepreneurs and what kinds of policy
reforms would mitigate this situation?
Participation in the informal economy may be enforced, in the sense
that there are no alternatives, but that does not mean that all participants
are therefore just “getting by” until a better opportunity presents itself in
the formal economy. One of the most vexing questions for small-business
advocates in South Africa is what is commonly seen as an underdeveloped
5
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entrepreneurial motivation or “spirit” amongst those living in more disadvantaged areas of the country. Some studies have contested this stereotype
while others have sought explanations that are lodged in the repressive
legacy of apartheid and the dysfunctional South African education system.
The perception that migrants are far more successful entrepreneurs than
South Africans in the informal economy has prompted a new research focus
on migrant entrepreneurial orientation and motivation and favourable comparisons with South African entrepreneurs. Migrants tend to score better
than South Africans on various indicators of entrepreneurial orientation
including achievement, innovation, personal initiative and “competitive
intelligence.”
The three countries (and four municipalities) discussed in this report
represent contrasting policy responses to the informal economy and informal migrant entrepreneurship. The predominant attitude towards the
informal economy in Zimbabwe over the last decade has been extremely
negative and at odds with the reality of survival in a rapidly shrinking formal
economy with mass unemployment. These views culminated in the nationwide assault on informality through Operation Murambatsvina (Clean Out
the Trash) in 2005, which attempted to destroy all manifestations of urban
informality: businesses, markets and shelter. Murambatsvina temporarily
devastated the informal economy and the livelihoods of the urban poor in
many Zimbabwean cities but informality quickly rebounded and returned to
the urban spaces from which it had been erased. If Zimbabwe’s economic
recovery continues, it is important to know whether the state will adopt a
more tolerant approach to informality or whether the vast informal economy will continue to “fly under the radar” and be the target of repression.
In Mozambique, national and municipal authorities have traditionally
adopted a tolerant approach to the informal economy. While it has been
subject to periodic harassment, it is generally viewed within official circles
as an important and sustainable source of livelihood for the urban poor.
The policy aim is not to eliminate informality but to “discourage” illegality through registration and formalization. One mechanism has been the
establishment of formal urban markets where vendors pay rent for stands.
However, many of these stands remain unoccupied. In 2008, a simplified tax
for small businesses was introduced, payable as a percentage of turnover or
as a lump sum. However, uptake has been low. Informal entrepreneurs have
been largely resistant to such efforts, which are viewed as a “money grab by
the state.” There is some evidence that operators who have registered and
paid licences and taxes are more productive than those who spend a great
deal of effort evading the authorities, but the obstacles to formalization
and why this might be avoided or resisted need further research, as do the
implications of formalization.

6
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The South African response to informality lies somewhere between the
Mozambican and Zimbabwean, but has been neither consistent nor coherent. At the national level, recent initiatives illustrate the kinds of antiforeign thinking that inform the national government’s policy response.
The National Informal Business Upliftment Strategy was launched in 2013
focusing on skills development, product improvement, technology support, equipment, and help with registration. The stated target of business
upliftment is entrepreneurial activity in the informal economy. However,
it also expresses clear anti-foreign sentiments. Another was the tabling in
Parliament of the draconian Licensing of Businesses Bill in 2013. The Bill is
extremely punitive and would result in large-scale criminalization of current
informal activities. It also suggests that community-based organizations,
non-governmental organizations and others will be given the job of working
with the licensing authorities to police non-South African businesses. The
xenophobic attacks of 2008 demonstrated that there are elements in many
communities who need no encouragement to turn on their neighbours from
other African countries.
At the local level, in both Cape Town and Johannesburg, there are contradictions between policy statements affirming the positive contribution
of the informal economy and the actual implementation of policy. In late
2013, the Johannesburg City Council violently removed and confiscated
the inventory of an estimated 6,000 inner-city street traders, many of them
migrants. The City has commissioned a project to consider alternatives to
informality while simultaneously pursuing the declaration of large inner city
areas restricted and prohibited trade zones. Recent research on inner-city
Cape Town suggests that there is less violent but more systemic exclusion
and there is evidence of ongoing harassment of traders throughout the city.
Some of the most dedicated, enterprising and successful entrepreneurs in
the South African informal economy are migrants to the country. Under any
other circumstances they would probably be lauded by government as examples of successful small-scale micro-entrepreneurship. However, the state
and many citizens view their activities as highly undesirable simply because
of their national origins. Harassment, extortion and bribery of officialdom
are some of the daily costs of doing business in South Africa. Many entrepreneurs, especially in informal settlements and townships, face constant
security threats and enjoy minimal protection from the police.
The Growing Informal Cities (GIC) project is examining and profiling the “hidden” role of migrant informal entrepreneurship in different
Southern African cities. The cities were chosen for analysis and comparison because they represent different forms of migrant entrepreneurship. In
South African cities like Cape Town and Johannesburg, migrant entrepreneurs come from throughout Africa including Zimbabwe and Mozambique.
In Maputo and Harare, most migrant entrepreneurs are local but they struc7
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ture their businesses around the opportunities afforded by growing regional
integration and cross-border migration to and from South Africa. Policies
towards informality and informal entrepreneurship vary from country to
country. In Zimbabwe, the informal economy has been ruthlessly repressed
but survives nonetheless. In Mozambique, there is a laissez-faire attitude
towards the informal economy and attempts to formalize informal businesses
through registration have not been particularly successful. In South Africa,
informality is generally encouraged at the national level through training
programmes and support activities. But at the municipal level, the informal
economy is often viewed in negative terms and pathologized. The impacts
of national and municipal programmes and actions are uncertain especially
for migrant entrepreneurs. Indeed, these entrepreneurs, who could and do
contribute to inclusive growth, are subjected to social and economic exclusion which spills over into xenophobia.
The GIC project is generating a comparative body of knowledge about
informal migrant entrepreneurs, raising their profile in regional, national
and municipal policy debates with a view to effecting positive change in
the regulatory environment in which they operate. By allowing migrant
entrepreneurs to expand and reach their full potential, free of harassment
and exclusion, a major contribution can be made to facilitating inclusive
growth through informal entrepreneurship. To this end, GIC is advancing
understanding of the reciprocal links between mobility and informal entrepreneurship in Southern African cities through a programme of rigorous
research oriented to the economic growth and poverty reduction goals of
SADC governments, and impacting on policy implementation processes
around migration, development and urban management.

8
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introduCtion

C

ities in the South will absorb 95% of urban growth in the next two decades and by 2030 will be home to almost 4 billion people (or 80% of the
world’s urban population).1 Urban growth will be most intense in the cities
of Asia and Africa. Over half of the population of the African continent
will be living in urban areas by 2030 (or an estimated 750 million people).
Southern Africa is one of the fastest-urbanizing regions in the world.2 The
region currently has a population of approximately 210 million, at least 100
million of whom live in urban and peri-urban areas. More than 60% of the
population of two countries (Botswana and South Africa) is already urbanized.3 By mid-century, 11 countries are projected to have more urban than
rural dwellers (Figure 1). More than half of the overall regional population
already live in urban areas, a figure projected to rise to three-quarters by
2050. With rapid urbanization and persistent urban poverty, urban development challenges are set to intensify.4

Figure 1: Current and Projected Urbanization in SADC Countries
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Source: Adapted from UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs5
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Figure 2: Southern Africa Urban Population Growth, 1950-2050
80
70
60

% Urban

50
40
30
20
10
0
1950

1960

1970

1980

1990

2000

2010

2020

2030

2040

2050

Source: Adapted from UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division (2014)6

The African city is characterized by high and expanding degrees of
informality. Old dualistic conceptions of an economically and territorially
bounded “informal sector” in which desperate people participate as a temporary survival strategy until they can access the formal sector have given
way to the reality that informality is the permanent condition for many new
urbanites and is the defining feature of the landscape, politics and economy
of the contemporary African city.7 As Simone has argued, “accelerated
urbanization in Africa has produced cities whose formal physical, political
and social infrastructures are largely unable to absorb, apprehend or utilize
the needs, aspirations and resourcefulness of those who live within them.
As a result, the efforts to secure livelihoods depend on largely informalized
processes and a wide range of provisional and ephemeral institutions which
cultivate specific orientations toward, knowledge of, and practices for, dealing with urban life. Soon, the majority of Africans will live in peri-urban and
informal settlements often at the physical, if not necessarily social, margins
of the city.”8
The extent and importance of informality in African cities and to African economies is subject to widely varying estimates. The Economic Commission for Africa recently noted, for example, that “informal trade is as
old as the informal economy. It is the main source of job creation in Africa,
providing between 20 per cent and 75 per cent of total employment in most
countries.”9 In most African cities, informality is the “main game in town.”10
10
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Yet, as Potts notes, the lack of adequate data about informality “is scarcely
surprising as one defining feature is that it is unregistered, and very loose
treatment of the issue of ‘underemployment’ which often gets classified,
erroneously, as unemployment.”11 The International Labour Organization
(ILO) and the research-policy network Women in Informal Employment:
Globalizing and Organizing (WIEGO) have recently made considerable
advances in generating country comparable and regional estimates of the
size of the informal economy.12 Their data shows that informal employment
comprises more than half of non-agricultural employment in most regions
of the Global South – 82% in South Asia, 66% in Sub-Saharan Africa,
65% in East and Southeast Asia and 51% in Latin America.13 There is also
significant variation between countries. For example, the proportion of nonagricultural work in the informal sector ranges from 18% in South Africa to
40% in Zimbabwe to 71% in Mali (Figure 3).
Figure 3: Employment in the Informal Sector in Selected African Countries
(% of non-agricultural work)
80
70
60

%

50
40
30
20
10

Cote d’Ivoire

Mali

Zambia

Uganda

Madagascar

Tanzania

Liberia

Lesotho

Ethiopia

Zimbabwe

South Africa

0

Source: ILO14

Although the individual incomes of informal workers are often low,
cumulatively their activities contribute significantly to gross domestic product (GDP). The ILO has compiled data on the contribution of informal
enterprises to national GDP in 16 Sub-Saharan countries and, on average, the informal economy contributed 41%.15 The proportion varied from
58% in Ghana to 24% in Zambia. A more recent ILO publication provides
evidence of the contribution of the informal economy to the GDP of a
11
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smaller number of countries. It finds, for example, that in Benin, Niger and
Togo, the informal economy contributes more than 50% of non-agricultural
GDP.16 These figures show that the informal economy not only plays an
important employment generation and poverty alleviation role, but is critical to local economies.
In many African cities, informal enterprises are operated by internal and
international migrants. The extent and nature of mobile entrepreneurship
and the opportunities and challenges confronting migrant entrepreneurs are
under-researched in Africa in general and Southern Africa in particular.17
Their contribution to the informal economy and employment generation
in countries of destination and origin are similarly undervalued by policymakers. Informal migrant entrepreneurs are often viewed with suspicion, if
not outright hostility, by citizenries and officialdom. In part, this is because
central and municipal governments see them as increasing the growth of
an informal sector that they would rather see tamed or eradicated. Also,
it is because they are often incorrectly viewed as “illegal migrants” and
therefore, by definition, engaged in illicit activities. And, in countries with
high levels of xenophobia such as South Africa, migrant-owned businesses
are a very visible and easy target for xenophobic attacks.18 Violent attacks
on the property and lives of migrant entrepreneurs have become extremely
common in many South African cities – but are certainly not confined to
South Africa.19
This report provides the backdrop for a new and systematic research
agenda on migrant entrepreneurship in African cities. While increasing
attention is being paid to the drivers and forms of entrepreneurship in informal economies, much less of this policy and research focus (with the possible exception of informal cross-border trade) is directed at understanding
the links between mobility and informality. This report examines the current
state of knowledge about this relationship with particular reference to three
countries (Mozambique, South Africa and Zimbabwe) and four major cities
(Cape Town, Harare, Johannesburg and Maputo), identifying major themes,
knowledge gaps, research questions and policy implications.

urbaniZation and informality

I

n Southern Africa, differences in the countries and cities of South Africa,
Zimbabwe and Mozambique allow a comparative exploration of the links
between the informal economy, entrepreneurship and inclusive growth.
South Africa has the largest formal economy in the region but a relatively
small informal sector. Statistics South Africa’s (SSA) 2014 April to June
Quarterly Labour Force Survey recorded 2,379,000 people working in the
informal sector.20 This constitutes only 16.5% of non-agricultural employment.21 The South African informal sector is dominated by wholesale and

12
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retail trade (44%), community and social services (15%) and construction
(15%). Unlike in many other developing countries, only a small group of
people are involved in manufacturing (10%).22 Another unusual feature
of the South African informal economy is its gender composition. In the
majority of Sub-Saharan African countries, the percentage of women in the
informal sector is much higher than men; however, in South Africa more
men than women work in the informal sector.23 In Quarter 1 (2008), 46% of
those reporting that they worked in the informal sector were women while
by Quarter 4 (2014) this percentage was down to 40%, suggesting rapid
change.24
South Africa’s small informal sector is accompanied by very high unemployment levels. The latest available SSA figures recorded 5,154,000 people
as unemployed, while a further 2,419,000 were recorded as “discouraged”
job seekers.25 Combined, this constitutes 33.4% of the labour force.26 Many
commentators therefore feel that the South African informal economy
ought to be much larger. What is sometimes forgotten, however, is that
until the 1990s the informal economy was viewed by apartheid policymakers as “an ominous and unpleasant aberration (and) a blot on the urban
landscape.” The overwhelming policy thrust was “towards repression of
small-scale enterprises, seeking their excision from the urban landscape.”27
Given this apartheid legacy and associated hostility towards informality, the
key question may not be why the informal economy is not larger, but why,
after decades of repression, it is as large and important as it is. That said, a
body of research is emerging that looks at the barriers to self-employment in
contemporary South African cities. These include crime, the risk of business
failure, lack of start-up capital, high transport costs and social disincentives.28
Data for the Quarterly Labour Force Survey is gathered in such a way
that city-level statistics are unreliable. Disaggregation by province suggests that the size and nature of the informal sector differs significantly. In
the two most industrialized and urbanized provinces, the Western Cape
and Gauteng, the informal sector is relatively small (at 11% and 14% of
non-agricultural employment respectively).29 This contrasts with Limpopo
where 32% of non-agricultural work is in the informal sector. The Gauteng
City-Region Observatory’s Quality of Life Survey of 2013 interviewed a
representative sample of residents and suggests a bigger informal sector
in the region, however.30 Twenty-two percent of respondents who were
employed worked in the informal sector and 27% of respondent households
received some income from the informal sector. The main difficulty with
employment figures, of course, is that they inevitably include both business
owners and employees. The actual number of enterprises is more difficult
to gauge, especially as business failure is high and turnover common.31 A
panel survey of 300 informal businesses in Soweto, for example, found that
13
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55% of those operating in 2007 had failed by 2010.32 In 2004, the Bureau for
Market Research estimated that there were 748,700 informal outlets in the
country including 261,000 hawkers, 127,600 spaza shops, 40,100 shebeens
and 320,000 other types of businesses.33
Informal retailing has been the major focus of economic research on different sub-sectors of the informal economy in both Johannesburg and Cape
Town.34 Particularly common are small-area case studies of survivalist street
trading (particularly of food and handicrafts) in the inner city.35 The spaza
shop sector in low-income residential areas has also been increasingly studied.36 Other informal entrepreneurial activities that have attracted attention in Cape Town and Johannesburg include the minibus taxi industry,37
waste collection and recycling,38 shebeen operation,39 trade in medicinal
plants,40 poverty tourism41 and informal construction activity.42 Methodologically, an interesting approach to understanding the complexity and
dynamics of informal retail has been the use of GIS to map the spatial distribution of informal retail outlets and to relate this to other urban features
such as the transportation infrastructure and the location of competitor
formal retailers.43
As well as documenting the economic challenges of informality, the literature on Cape Town and Johannesburg raises two other important issues,
both of which have a bearing on the environment for entrepreneurship. The
first is the relationship between formal and informal retail. The linkages
between formal and informal enterprise are often overlooked in the conventional dualistic model that undergirds much analysis of a functionally and
spatially bounded informal sector.44 With regard to the issue of economic
competition, the central research question is whether the rapid expansion
of malls and supermarkets across the South African urban landscape, and
their recent penetration of low-income areas, is having a negative impact
on the informal economy.45 One study, for example, has argued that “one
of the primary threats is the encroachment of supermarkets into areas traditionally occupied by the informal market. There is, for example, strong
evidence that the informal sector is losing significant market share as a
result of the encroachment of supermarkets into the territories occupied by
the informal sector.”46 The study reports that between 2003 and 2005, spaza
shop turnover in some areas was reduced by as much as 22% as a result. In
contrast, a study of Tshwane argues that supermarkets have had a major
impact on corner stores and greengrocers but that informal vendors are far
more resilient.47
Studies in Soweto have found that the impact varies with the type of
informal business: although spazas and general dealers were negatively
affected by the advent of malls, street traders were not.48 In nearby Ekurhuleni, however, formal retail dominates the informal food economy because
the latter’s collective buying power is not being used in the same way as
14
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large formal retailers of fruit and vegetables to obtain better terms of trade
with suppliers.49 The African Food Security Urban Network (AFSUN) data
for Cape Town and Johannesburg shows that the majority of poor urban
households source food from both supermarkets (for staples in bulk on a
monthly basis) and informal vendors (for street food and fresh produce
several times a week).50 The possibility of corporate social responsibility programmes being directed to supporting informal entrepreneurs has recently
been mooted. One study concludes that “business development support has
a positive effect on lifting income and reducing poverty for microenterprise
owners.”51
Formalization of informal businesses is the other issue that has become
increasingly important in South Africa. This has been given greater profile
in part due to the ILO’s 2014-15 standard-setting process on “Formalizing
the Informal Economy.” For reasons including greater legal control, collection of taxes and registration fees, enforcement of labour legislation and
identification and deportation of irregular migrants running businesses,
the central, provincial and local South African authorities would all like
to see the informal economy subject to formal rules and regulations. Many
researchers see formalization as good for informal business since it would
promote access to private finance and state-funded training programmes.52
Chen does caution that “it is important to ensure that formalization offers
the benefits and protections that come with being formal and does not simply impose the costs of becoming formal.” She also notes that formalization
has different meanings and implications for different categories of informal
workers.53 In South Africa, the drive towards formalization has progressed
furthest in the taxi industry but many sectors of the informal economy
remain outside the formal regulatory fold. Most informal entrepreneurs are
opposed to formalization, stressing the financial costs and constraints on
business flexibility. Attempts by the state to promote formalization in the liquor sector have led, perhaps counterintuitively, to greater informalization.54
The Zimbabwean experience raises important questions about the links
between the collapse of the formal economy and the growth of informality.55
At independence in 1980, Zimbabwe’s urban informal economy was small,
absorbing about 10% of the labour force. By 2003, it accounted for over
70% of the labour force and its contribution to GNI had grown to around
60% – one of the highest in Sub-Saharan Africa.56 In Harare, the informal
economy rapidly expanded even as the formal economy shrank and rates of
unemployment soared above 80%.57 In 2011, a ZimStat survey found that
84% of the workforce were in informal employment. The largest number
were in retail and wholesale trade followed by repair of motor vehicles and
cycles, services and manufacturing. Women constituted 53% of those in
informal employment.58 There have been few studies (in Zimbabwe and
elsewhere) of the impact of state failure on the urban informal economy.
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Yet, as Dube points out, under conditions of economic crisis and state failure there are “many business opportunities that may arise and being tied to
an employer in the formal sector may preclude an entrepreneurial worker’s
participation in more lucrative income generating activities in the informal
sector.”59
There are strong indications that the collapse of the Zimbabwean economy actually impacted positively on the entrepreneurial motivations and
skills of ordinary Zimbabweans.60 One case study has suggested that after
2004 there was a major shift within the informal economy from household
informal employment towards small enterprise development and employment.61 At the very least this points to the informal economy not as a site
of desperation and last resort but a space of energy and innovation. As Dube
concludes, “instead of treating the informal sector as an undifferentiated
residual sector, there is a need for studies on informality in Zimbabwe that
disaggregate this sector by sub-sector of activities and by locales – examining differences in activities, barriers to entry/exit and employment relationships in the various sub-sectors and/or locales.”62
Mozambique, and Maputo in particular, represent a different context
within which to explore the links between informal entrepreneurship and
formal economic growth. The Mozambican economy was virtually destroyed
by the civil war in the 1980s and the informal economy was how the vast
majority of urban residents managed to survive.63 In the last two decades,
however, Mozambique has had one of the fastest growing formal economies
in Africa. Yet, the informal economy has proven to be extremely resilient.
The Ministry of Planning and Development, for example, estimated that
informal activity represented 41% of GDP in 2003 and 40% in 2004.64 A
2005 national sample survey concluded that 75% of the economically active
population was employed informally in Mozambique. Another survey of
Maputo found that 70% of households were involved in informal economic
activities and 64% of jobs were estimated to be in the informal economy.
The involvement was significantly higher in female-headed households
(86%) than male-headed households (62%).65
Although research on the informal economy in Maputo is not as extensive as in Harare or South African cities such as Johannesburg, a number
of studies have highlighted the dynamism and heterogeneity of the sector
and the role of informal entrepreneurship in poverty reduction.66 The most
common type of informal economic activity is the sale of products such as
foodstuffs and petty commodities. Many are also involved in desenrascar
(“finding a way out”), which involves everything from small-scale repairs to
sex work and theft. The most profitable activities are hairdressing, the sale
of second-hand clothes and traditional medicine. Other common informal
activities include the sale of water, production of building material and furniture, garbage picking, selling cell-phone airtime and the sale of charcoal
and home-made brews.67
16
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international miGration in southern afriCa

T

he end of apartheid brought a major reconfiguration of international
migration flows in Southern Africa.68 Legal entries through South
African land border posts and airports rose from less than 1 million in 1990
to 6 million in 2000, and 15 million in 2014.69 These entrants (totalling
nearly 130 million from 2000 to 2013) include tourists, visitors, migrant
workers, immigrants, students, medical travellers, shoppers, investors, conference delegates, diplomats, asylum-seekers and informal traders. Among
the entrants are those who give one purpose for entry (for example, holiday) and then engage in other activities, such as working in the informal
economy. The vast majority of those who enter do so on a temporary basis,
although there is some discrepancy in official statistics between arrivals and
departures each year (Figure 4). The departure figures are likely to be a serious underestimate as exits are not tracked as conscientiously as entries.70
This clearly shows the problems associated with the exit data. At the Zimbabwean border, for example, busloads of passengers are often simply waved
through by South African immigration officials.71 However, arrivals data
also includes many non-visitors.

Figure 4: South African Arrivals and Departures, 2000-2013
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Source: Statistics South Africa72

Arrivals

Departures

Data collected by Statistics South Africa on foreign arrivals is split into
two categories: non-visitors (e.g. temporary or permanent migrants, labour
migrants, asylum seekers, students) and visitors (same-day visitors and tourists). Of the 15,154,991 people who visited South Africa in 2013, 837,083
17

2013

2012

2011

2010

2009

2008

2007

2006

2005

2004

2003

2002

2001

2000

0

Informal mIgrant EntrEprEnEurshIp and InclusIvE growth

(5.5%) were non-visitors while 14,317,908 (94.5%) were visitors (Table 1).
The visitors were made up of 4,781,340 same-day visitors and 9,536,568
overnight visitors or tourists. The vast majority of the same-day visitors
(98%) came by road from neighbouring SADC countries and 69% of the
tourists also came from SADC countries, including Zimbabwe (20.3% of
the total number of tourists), Lesotho (15.3%), Mozambique (11.7%), Swaziland (8.8%) and Botswana (5.6%).
Table 1: Region of Origin of Visitors to South Africa, 2013
Number
Non-visitors
Overseas

Visitors

Tourist

837,083

5.5

14,317,908

94.5

222,128

1.5

4,542,149

30.0

Other Africa

13,906

0.1

Unspecified

3,157

0.0

Total

4,781,340

31.5

Overseas

2,660,631

17.6

SADC

6,618,866

43.7

Other Africa

237,186

1.6

Unspecified

19,885

0.1

SADC
Same day

Percentage

Total
Total

9,536,568

62.9

15,154,991

100.0

Source: Statistics South Africa73

The precise numbers of international migrants living in South Africa are
unknown, although the 2011 South African Census provides the best current set of estimates. The Census recorded a total of 1.6 million non-citizens
in the country, half of whom were in the province of Gauteng (Table 2).
Table 2: Foreign Citizens Living in South Africa, 2011
Province

No. of citizens

No. of non-citizens

% of non-citizens

Western Cape

5,650,462

180,815

3.2

Eastern Cape

6,437,586

57,938

0.9

Northern Cape

1,125,306

10,128

0.9

Free State

2,663,080

50,599

1.9

10,113,978

111,254

1.1

3,439,700

120,390

3.5

11,952,392

848,620

7.1

Mpumalanga

3,983,570

103,573

2.6

Limpopo

5,322,134

138,375

2.6

50,688,208

1,621,692

3.2

KwaZulu-Natal
North West
Gauteng

Total
Source: Statistics South Africa74
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The South African migrant stock (those born outside the country) was
dominated by Zimbabweans (a total of 515,000 adults between the ages of 15
and 64) (Table 3). Other countries with 70,000 migrants or more in South
Africa include Mozambique, Lesotho and Malawi. The only non-African
country in the top 10 is India (at 24,000). Many migrant entrepreneurs
in South Africa entered the country as asylum-seekers and later obtained
refugee status. The number of asylum applications rose dramatically from
around 16,000 in 1996 to a peak of about 220,000 in 2009, primarily as a
result of claims submitted by Zimbabweans (Figure 5).
Table 3: Foreign Migrants Living in South Africa by Country of Birth and Employment Status
Total

Employment rate
(%)

Unemployment
rate (%)

Labour force
participation rate (%)

Zimbabwe

515,824

66

18

80

Mozambique

262,556

58

24

76

Lesotho

124,463

51

30

73

Malawi

69,544

72

14

84

Namibia

29,653

67

10

74

Swaziland

27,471

52

22

67

India

23,780

64

6

68

Zambia

22,833

70

9

76

Nigeria

20,983

69

13

79

Congo

18,545

52

24

68

Source: Budlender75

Figure 5: Applications for Refugee Status in South Africa, 1996-2012
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Source: UNHCR Statistical Yearbook (Various Reports)
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Migration to South Africa has been the dominant form of movement
from post-colonial Zimbabwe, especially for the semi-skilled and unskilled.76
Movement from Zimbabwe to South Africa has grown rapidly in recent decades (Figure 6). The number of Zimbabweans entering South Africa legally
and temporarily for various reasons rose from 255,988 in 1990 to 477,380
in 2000 and to 1,847,973 in 2012. In 2012, the majority of Zimbabweans
(97%) indicated holiday as their purpose of entry while other categories
included transit (1.5%), business (1%) and study (0.6 %). Many “holiday
makers” from Zimbabwe are known to engage in a wide variety of incomegenerating activities in South Africa, particularly informal trade.
Figure 6: Legal Entries of Zimbabweans into South Africa, 1980-2012
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In 2001, the South African Census recorded 130,090 Zimbabwe-born
people in the country (a figure that included 54,294 whites who had left
Zimbabwe after independence in 1980). Only a decade later, the 2011
Census counted a total of 515,824 Zimbabweans aged between 15 and 64 in
South Africa.77 This increase occurred despite a major campaign to deport
Zimbabweans, which saw the number of deportees rise from 43,000 in 1999
(or 23% of total deportations) to 205,000 in 2007 (or two-thirds of the
total) (Table 4). In total, between 2000 and 2008, nearly 600,000 Zimbabweans were deported from South Africa.
Zimbabwean migrants responded to the mass deportations by applying in
large numbers for refugee status in South Africa, which would protect them
from deportation. The number of refugee claimants rose from just four in
2001 to 149,453 in 2009 (Figure 7). Holders of renewable asylum-seeker
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permits were allowed to remain legally in South Africa until their claims
were adjudicated. The mounting pressures on the refugee determination
system and the costly failure of the deportation campaign led the South
African government to introduce a moratorium on deportations that lasted
from 2009 to 2012. It also implemented an “immigration amnesty” for Zimbabweans in 2010.78 By the time the amnesty ended in mid-2011, a total
of 242,371 Zimbabweans had been granted four-year residence permits in
South Africa. In August 2014, the South African government introduced a
new programme extending these permits by a further three years.
Table 4: Deportations of Zimbabweans from South Africa, 1999-2008
Deportations
Total deportees

Zimbabwean deportees

Zimbabwean deportees as
% of total

1999

183,861

42,769

23.3

2000

145,575

45,922

31.5

2001

156,123

47,697

30.6

2002

135,870

38,118

28.1

2003

164,808

55,753

33.8

2004

167,137

72,112

43.1

2005

209,988

97,433

46.4

2006

266,067

109,532

41.2

2007

312,733

204,827

65.5

2008

280,837

164,678

58.6

Source: Department of Home Affairs (South Africa) Annual Reports

A 2010 SAMP survey of working-age Zimbabweans in two South African cities (Cape Town and Johannesburg) prior to the amnesty found that
52% held asylum-seeker permits, 19% held work permits and only 2% had
acquired permanent residence.79 Until recently, most migrants from Zimbabwe engaged in circular migration, spending only short periods in South
Africa, returning home frequently and showing little inclination to remain
in South Africa. The 2010 SAMP survey was limited to migrants who had
gone to South Africa for the first time between 2005 and 2010 and painted
a very different picture. South Africa is increasingly seen as a longer-term
destination rather than a temporary place to earn quick money. Nearly half
of the respondents said that they wanted to remain in South Africa “for
a few years” and another 21% that they wanted to remain indefinitely or
permanently. In other words, two-thirds of recent migrants viewed a longterm stay in South Africa as desirable and many are bringing their families
with them.
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Figure 7: Asylum Applications by Zimbabweans in South Africa, 2001-2010
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Post-apartheid migration patterns between Mozambique and South
Africa have a rather different history. The dominant form of movement
between the two countries for most of the twentieth century was contract
migration to the South African mines, predominantly from rural areas of
Mozambique.80 In the 1980s, however, the civil war in Mozambique led
to a major influx of asylum-seekers, estimated to be anywhere between
300,000 and 400,000 people. Most settled along the border between the two
countries and were integrated into local communities and worked on local
farms.81 Those who migrated to the cities tended to work in the informal
economy although many were arrested and deported, with the number of
deportations peaking at 156,000 in 1996 (Table 5). In 2000, an immigration amnesty gave South African residency status to an estimated 110,000
former refugees and the number of deportations immediately fell by 50%.82
After 2004, and the abandonment of visa restrictions on Mozambicans,
cross-border traffic increased from around 400,000 documented entries per
annum to nearly 1.8 million in 2013 (Figure 8). As with Zimbabweans, the
Mozambicans comprised a wide variety of migrants with different reasons
for entry. And as with Zimbabweans, many of the migrants overstayed as
“undocumented migrants” where they did menial jobs and worked in the
informal economy.83 However, one of the primary motivators was crossborder informal trade between Maputo and South African border towns as
well as cities such as Johannesburg.
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Table 5: Deportation of Mozambicans from South Africa, 1990-2004
Deportations
Total deportees

Mozambican deportees

Mozambican deportees as
% of total

1990

53,418

42,330

79.2

1991

61,345

47,074

76.7

1992

82,575

61,210

74.1

1993

96,600

80,926

83.8

1994

90,692

74,279

81.9

1995

157,084

131,689

83.8

1996

180,713

157,425

87.1

1997

176,351

146,285

83.0

1998

181,286

141,506

78.1

1999

183,861

123,961

67.4

2000

145,575

84,738

58.2

2001

156,123

94,404

60.5

2002

151,653

83,695

55.2

2003

164,808

82,067

49.8

2004

167,137

81,619

48.8

Note: Deportation figures for Mozambique are available only up to 2004
Source: Department of Home Affairs (South Africa) Annual Reports

Figure 8: Legal Entries of Mozambicans into South Africa, 1999-2013
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miGrants and the informal eConomy

M

obility is essential to the operation and dynamism of the urban informal economy in Southern African cities. Within urban areas, mobility
is a vital component of the business strategies of informal operatives who
identify spaces with niche markets or a relative absence of the formal sector.
While some businesses operate from fixed sites others are extremely mobile,
operating in different parts of the city on different days or at different times
of a single day. Many of the participants in the informal economy are internal or international migrants, often in competition with one another for
the same market share. Although the numbers of international migrants
are frequently exaggerated, it is clear that they have played an increasingly
important role in the informal economies of Southern African cities over
the last two decades and have reshaped the nature of informality and informal entrepreneurship in the region. Yet the importance of that role is often
underestimated, invisible to researchers and denigrated by policy-makers.84
The emerging literature on migrant entrepreneurship in South Africa
focuses on several issues:
neurs;85
86

capital, cost-saving strategies such as shared shop spaces, revenueboosting strategies such as bulk buying, and material support such as
accommodation for newly-arrived migrants;87 and
In the 1990s and early 2000s, most migrant entrepreneurs settled in
Johannesburg or Cape Town.88 These two cities continue to be the major
sites of informal migrant enterprise. However, one of the distinctive spatial
features of migrant entrepreneurship is its diffusion throughout the country
and down the urban hierarchy to many intermediate and smaller cities. A
growing number of recent studies attest to the increase in business activity
of migrant entrepreneurs in other South African urban centres.89 This is a
response to the fact that the policing of informality and immigration is more
relaxed in smaller centres, as well as being a search for new markets.
According to census data, rates of unemployment amongst migrants
in South Africa are generally lower than amongst South Africans, varying
from a low of 6% in the case of Indian migrants to a high of 30% in the case
of migrants from Lesotho. Only 18% of Zimbabwean and 24% of Mozambican migrants were unemployed in 2011 (Table 3). Many of those formally
recorded as unemployed are, in fact, working in the informal economy.90
A 2010 SAMP survey of post-2005 Zimbabwean migrants in Johannesburg
and Cape Town, for example, found that 20% were involved in the infor24
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mal economy.91 Studies of other migrant groups such as Somalis suggest
even higher rates of informal economy participation.92 Asylum seekers and
refugees from various countries are largely excluded from the formal labour
market and show high levels of enterprise and innovation in the informal
economy.93
The Bureau of Market Research estimated that 80% of 4,584 informal
traders in inner-city Johannesburg in 2004 were non-South Africans, with
30% Nigerians, 30% Ethiopians and Somalis and 20% a mixture of Rwandans, Congolese and Zimbabweans.94 A recent analysis of the 2012 South
African Quarterly Labour Force Survey (Q3) showed clear differences
between South Africans and international migrants.95 For example, 21% of
international migrants were classified as self-employed compared with 7%
of internal migrants and 9% of non-migrants. However, only 13% of the
total number of self-employed were international migrants compared with
15% of internal migrants and 71% of non-migrants. These differences were
amplified in data by sector. As many as 33% of international migrants were
in the informal sector, compared with 11% of internal migrants and 16% of
non-migrants. Again, the absolute number of international migrants was
much smaller, at 12% of the total compared with 14% of internal migrants
and 74% of non-migrants. There is also evidence of a growing diversification of migrant source countries. Most migrants are still from neighbouring
countries but there are growing numbers from many other African countries
as well as farther afield, including Bangladesh, Pakistan and China.96
Migrants are often more entrepreneurial than most, yet the constraints
they face in establishing and growing their businesses are considerable.
Their general contribution to employment creation and inclusive growth
is undervalued and often misrepresented as a threat. Foreign migrants in
the South African informal economy do have considerable entrepreneurial
ambition but are severely hampered in growing their enterprises by a range
of obstacles.97 These have not been systematically researched but include:
and conditions of entry and the ability to move along migration corridors
between countries;
cial and support services;
deportation disrupting business activity;
refused bank accounts and loans);
sector; and
98
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Violent attacks on the persons and properties of migrant business
operations – whether motivated by rivalry, criminality or xenophobia or a
combination of these – are regular and frequent and involve considerable
loss of life. The nature and challenges posed by violence against migrant
entrepreneurs are considered in detail in two companion SAMP reports.99
In terms of economic challenges confronting informal-sector entrepreneurs, both South African and migrant, a major issue is the lack of access
to financial services including start-up capital and ongoing credit. Formal
financial institutions are extremely reluctant to do business with migrant
informal entrepreneurs. These entrepreneurs “have limited access to debt
finance from commercial banks as they have problems in opening bank
accounts, and acquiring visas and permits. In addition, most…have never
applied for credit, despite the need for credit and may thus be classified as
discouraged borrowers.”100 Fatoki’s study of 148 migrant entrepreneurs in
inner-city Johannesburg found that 29% had applied for credit and another
43% who were in need of credit had not. Of those who applied, only a
third were successful.101 Tengeh’s study of 135 migrant entrepreneurs in
Cape Town found that only 10% had obtained a bank loan to start their
businesses.102 Khosa’s recent study of 93 Cape Town entrepreneurs from 19
African countries found that only 9% had acquired a bank loan as start-up
capital compared with 37% who had used personal funds and 36% who
had relied on family and friends.103 As a result of the lack of credit, many
migrant entrepreneurs rely on various financial bootstrapping alternatives to
minimize their capital outlay and running costs (Table 6).
Despite these financial challenges, there is evidence of upward mobility
of migrant-owned businesses in terms of the growth of business capital. In
one study, the majority of African immigrant entrepreneurs in Cape Town
(71%) had initial start-up business capital in the ZAR1,000 to ZAR5,000
range. After three or more years of operation the financial capital of nearly
40% had grown to an estimated range of ZAR50,000 to ZAR100,000.105
This was a notable achievement in an environment where the rate of newbusiness failure is estimated at between 70% and 80%.106 Immigrant entrepreneurs in South Africa, for instance, have long working hours, resulting
in increased gross earnings.107 Through risk-taking and heavy investment
in their businesses, some entrepreneurs have been able to increase the size
of their operations and have even managed to turn them into formal businesses.108 Many use mobile phones and other technology that allows for
increased interaction with suppliers and customers while reducing the need
to travel.109 Some also make use of social media, for instance, advertising
their services on Facebook. However, a large number still lack access to
computers, and records continue to be kept manually.110 It has been suggested that the success of some immigrant-owned businesses in South Africa
is largely due to immigrant entrepreneurs’ superior qualifications. One study
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in Cape Town, for example, showed that at least 30% had completed tertiary
education.111 Empirically, it has been demonstrated that learning contributes to higher levels of earnings by providing a solid basis for the development of an entrepreneurial culture.112
Table 6: Financial Bootstrapping by Migrant Entrepreneurs in Inner-City Johannesburg
No.

%

Share premises with others

141

95

Delay owner’s/manager’s salary

136

92

Obtain loans from family and friends

123

83

Employ relatives and/or friends at non-market salary

115

78

Seek out best conditions possible with suppliers

113

76

Buy on consignment from suppliers

108

73

Contribute capital via other projects that pay the owner

101

68

Offer customers discounts for cash payments

86

58

Get payments in advance from customers

80

54

Use manager’s private credit card for business expenses

77

52

Buy used rather than new equipment

77

52

Deliberately delay payments to suppliers

76

51

Deliberately choose customers who pay quickly

73

49

End a business relationship with a frequently-late-paying customer

72

48

Use different routines for minimizing capital invested in stock

65

44

Use routines to speed up invoicing

62

42

Coordinate purchases with other businesses (for better agreements)

61

41

Borrow equipment or machinery from other businesses

56

38

Hire staff for short periods instead of employing permanently

56

38

Share equipment with other businesses

37

25

Give the same terms of payment to all customers

16

11

Source: Fatoki104

Proponents of the idea of “brain waste” argue that the educational
qualifications of migrants are devalued and wasted if they cannot obtain
suitable employment in the formal economy. This may well be the case
when migrants are unable to obtain jobs that are commensurate with their
levels of education and training. However, the brain-waste thesis also suggests that working in the informal economy is the ultimate form of wastage, “where educated immigrants find employment in the informal sector,
which is typically characterised by low worker productivity, poor working
conditions, low or non-existent worker protection and uncertain job prospects.”113 While this is not necessarily incorrect regarding employment
in the informal economy, it ignores the fact that many educated migrant
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entrepreneurs are business owners employing others. Formal qualifications
and experience might not have prepared them for running an informal business but these are not necessarily wasted if used to make a success of a new
enterprise.
A central premise of the hostility towards foreign migrants in South Africa is that they “steal” jobs from South Africans. However, a study in Johannesburg in the late 1990s suggested that migrant-owned businesses actually
created jobs for South Africans through direct hire.114 This finding has been
widely cited and generalized but was based on a small sample in a localized
area of the city so its representativeness is unknown. Subsequent case study
research has consistently corroborated that migrant entrepreneurs generate
employment for other migrants and for South Africans.115 Tengeh’s study
of 135 migrant entrepreneurs from Cameroon, Ethiopia, Ghana, Senegal
and Somalia in Cape Town, for example, found that 70 (52%) had paid
employees. Of these, 48% employed South Africans and 52% employed
family members or members of the same ethnic group.116 As many as 70%
agreed or strongly agreed that when they started their businesses, most of
their employees were South Africans. However, as their businesses grew,
they tended to employ more people from their home country.117
Kalitanyi’s study of 120 migrant entrepreneurs from Somalia, Nigeria
and Senegal, also in Cape Town, found that 82% employed South Africans,
4% employed non-South Africans and 14% employed both.118 Although
the majority in all three groups preferred to hire South Africans, the preference was strongest amongst Senegalese and weakest amongst Nigerians.
Seventy-four percent of the entrepreneurs said that they had transferred
skills to South Africans in the process of employing them. More research is
needed, however, on why migrant entrepreneurs employ South Africans and
under what conditions. The essence of an inclusive growth perspective on
informality is that the sector should create “decent jobs”. Whether or not
the jobs created deserve this label has yet to be established.
A different picture emerges in Radipere’s comparative study of 220 South
African-owned and 214 migrant-owned SMMEs in Tshwane and Johannesburg.119 Two-thirds of the South African enterprises employed other South
Africans and only 5% employed non-South Africans (Table 7). Nearly 30%
employed both. Only 12% of the migrant-owned enterprises employed only
South Africans while 40% employed only other migrants. The largest number, almost half, employed South Africans and non-South Africans. Since
the three studies all tended to focus on similar sectors, it is possible that the
employment practices vary between Gauteng and Cape Town.
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Table 7: Employment Creation by Informal Entrepreneurs, Tshwane and Johannesburg
South African-owned (%)
South African employees
Foreign employees
South African and foreign employees

Foreign-owned (%)

64.8

11.8

4.7

39.6

28.6

48.1

Other employees

1.9

0.5

N

220

214

Source: Radipere120

informal Cross-border tradinG

S

ince the end of apartheid, South Africa has emerged as a market and
source of goods for small-scale entrepreneurs whose short-term temporary visits are often conducted under the legal umbrella of visiting or tourism.121 When it comes to relations between South Africa, Mozambique and
Zimbabwe, most of this business is conducted by individuals travelling overland and engaged in so-called ICBT (informal cross-border trade). ICBT is
a major catalyst for involvement in informal economies globally.122 Trading
across borders plays a vital, though largely unrecognized, role in regional
economic integration and in linking informal economies in different SADC
cities. This requires a perspective on informality that takes into account the
impacts of interaction between different urban informal spaces across the
region.123 The volume of cross-border trade has been monitored at border
control points in previous studies and there is a need to update and compare the current situation with that in the past and assess whether changes
in the immigration regimes of the region, and the growth of informality
in cities, have impacted on the volume of trade and the types of goods
being transported.124 More than that, informal traders need to be seen as
entrepreneurs per se and their activities as a potentially strong promoter
of inclusive growth and employment creation across the region. There has
certainly been a tendency in the past to view informal traders as sole operators rather than micro-enterprises with the potential to grow significantly,
to create jobs and to generate the capital to branch out into other sectors of
the informal and formal economy.
In Mozambique and Zimbabwe, a sizeable number of informal entrepreneurs are international migrants. They establish their businesses in their
home cities such as Harare and Maputo and grow them by taking advantage of the opportunities provided by cross-border economic linkages and
migration. Informal cross-border traders, many of them women, thus play
a critical role in the circulation of formally and informally produced goods
throughout the SADC region.125 The African Development Bank estimates
that informal cross-border trade constitutes between 30% and 40% of total
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intra-SADC trade with an average annual value of USD17.6 billion.126
There have been some efforts to monitor the overall volume of trade in
foodstuffs, most notably by FEWSNET.127 There are marked annual fluctuations in informal flows of maize, rice and beans depending on domestic
harvests and market opportunities (Figure 9).
Figure 9: Intra-SADC Informal Cross-Border Trade in Food Staples, 2005-2012
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A SAMP border-monitoring survey of 85,000 traders found that some
crossed borders to buy goods for sale in their home countries (53% of the
total), some took goods to sell in another country (32%) and some bought
and sold in countries of origin and destination as “two-way” traders (13%)
(Table 8).129 The relative importance of these three trading types varied
from country to country. In the case of Mozambique, the vast majority of
traders go to buy goods, mainly in South Africa, for sale at home (81%) and
very few (1%) take goods from Mozambique to sell. By contrast, only 27%
of traders from Zimbabwe go to buy goods to bring home and 21% take
goods from Zimbabwe to sell. Two-way trading is the most important form
of activity in Zimbabwe (with 48% compared to only 12% of Mozambican
traders). The survey also examined the types of goods being carried across
borders. A wide variety of goods was being brought back to sell in the home
country although, again, there was considerable inter-country variation
(Table 9). Food items (processed and fresh) were clearly the most important
but there was also considerable trade in new and second-hand clothing and
household goods. The differences between Zimbabwe and Mozambique
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were, however, relatively slight with similar proportions of traders carrying
groceries and clothing. The only significant difference was with fresh produce, which was more likely to be carried to Mozambique than Zimbabwe.
Table 8: Type of Cross-Border Trading Activity (%)
One-way traders
Country of survey

Bringing back
goods to sell

Taking goods
to sell

Two-way traders

Other

Botswana

25

66

7

2

Lesotho

81

19

0

0

Malawi

60

37

3

0

Mozambique

81

1

12

6

Namibia

54

44

1

0

Swaziland

88

8

1

2

Zambia

58

37

5

1

Zimbabwe

27

21

48

4

Total

53

32

13

2

Source: SAMP130

Table 9: Types of Goods Carried by Cross-Border Traders for Sale in Home Country (%)
Country of
destination

Groceries

Fresh
fruit &
vegetables

Meat/
fish/
eggs

Electrical
goods

Furniture

Household
goods

Clothing/
shoes

Handicrafts/
curios

Other

Botswana

8

27

1

1

1

16

19

10

21

Lesotho

10

31

1

-

-

6

17

10

24

Malawi

18

7

0

20

1

23

38

0

24

Mozambique

70

21

61

6

1

4

13

-

9

Namibia

56

16

6

3

1

8

3

2

19

Swaziland

4

7

0

3

1

19

65

1

10

Zambia

29

14

8

4

1

8

38

3

16

Zimbabwe

69

2

1

8

1

3

12

0

3

Source: SAMP131

A survey of 120 cross-border traders in Johannesburg (just over a quarter of whom were from Mozambique and Zimbabwe) reached interesting
findings about trading frequency and the financial spend of traders buying
goods in South Africa for resale.132 Seventy-two percent of the respondents
were buying in South Africa for resale in their home countries and 26% had
brought goods to sell in South Africa. The spend per trip was very significant,
and certainly belies the image of impoverished survivalists often attached to
cross-border traders. Nearly half spent more than ZAR10,000 per trip and
two-thirds spent more than ZAR6,000 per trip (Figure 10). However, this
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does not capture the total spend since the vast majority enter South Africa
more than once during the course of the average year. Over 90% made trips
to South Africa three or more times per year (Figure 11). The survey also
provided preliminary evidence about the challenges experienced by crossborder traders, most of which were non-economic (Table 10). For example,
40% mentioned crime and theft as a problem, 24% mentioned xenophobic
discrimination and 22% police harassment.
Figure 10: Money Spent in South Africa Per Visit by Cross-Border Traders
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Figure 11: Number of Trips to South Africa Per Year by Cross-Border Traders
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Table 10: Problems Faced by Cross-Border Traders in Johannesburg
Problem

% of respondents

Crime/theft

39

Cost/location/condition of accommodation

29

Discrimination/harassment due to xenophobia

24

Harassment by police

23

Visa, passport and trading licence application problems/time consumed

22

High rent of stalls

15

Transport problems

11

Tax and tax refund problems

10

Length of visa too short

8

Expensive items

8

Bad service from other stores and general public

6

Too few designated selling points

6

Border and customs control difficulties

5

Import duty procedures

3

Difficulties with securing work permits

3

Communication/language problems

3

Source: SPB135

In Harare, and other Zimbabwean cities, case-study research has been
done on the profiles, activities, opportunities and obstacles that confront
informal cross-border traders.136 The literature on cross-border trading and
the informal economy in Maputo is far more limited.137 The primary focus of
the Zimbabwean literature has been on informal cross-border trade as a survival and poverty alleviation strategy for women and their households in the
face of severe economic crisis and unprecedented levels of formal unemployment. There is little evidence that cross-border trading represents an opportunity for sustained capital accumulation and business expansion for most.
One of the reasons is the vulnerability of traders to exploitation and abuse
during the course of their business activities. Crossing borders is itself a trial
of demands for sex and bribes, eating into already small profits. Harassment
en route and in cities of destination has forced traders to adopt strategies to
protect themselves from criminality and xenophobic hostility.138
The literature on informal entrepreneurship tends to focus on the individual entrepreneur and firm rather than their forms of cooperation. Some
cross-border traders in Zimbabwe have combined to form traders’ associations to further their collective interests. For example, the Zimbabwe Cross
Border Traders Association (ZCBTA) was formed in 2000 with a mandate
“to promote and defend the interests of its members (and) to enhance the
capacity of small scale traders/producers to create their own wealth through
development of viable linkages and advocating for an enabling environ33
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ment for the traders at all levels, i.e. nationally, regionally and globally.”139
It has just over 7,000 traders organized into trade committees and chapters
across the country. ZCBTA and other trader organizations still only represent about 5%-7% of an estimated 300,000 cross-border traders. Their
combined membership is three-quarters female. A more informal strategy of
combination is a response to the dangers of travelling alone to South Africa
to do business. Zimbabwean women travel together, reside with others and
conduct their business in groups as a form of protection against the depredations of criminals and the police.140

informal remittinG enterPrise

A

related aspect of the relationship between migration and informal
entrepreneurship is the massive flow of cash remittances and goods
that migrants in Johannesburg and Cape Town send to Mozambique and
Zimbabwe, including the cities of Maputo and Harare.141 One study recently claimed that remittance flows from South Africa to other SADC countries increased from ZAR6.1 billion in 2006 to ZAR11.2 billion in 2012.142
Although most migrants in South Africa tend to remit to rural households,
there is evidence of a flow of remittances to households in both Maputo and
Harare. The majority of remittances are sent to immediate or extended family members for their personal use. As a result, most remittances are spent
on basic household needs including food, education, health and clothing.
Only a very small proportion of remittances are saved or invested in productive enterprise. At the same time, the expenditure of remittances, especially
on food and clothing, does benefit retailers in the informal economy of these
cities. What we do not know is what proportion of remittances are generated within the informal economy of South Africa cities.
The business opportunities for small-scale entrepreneurs in the remittances industry relate more to the channels through which remittances
of cash and goods are sent home by migrants. The use of formal remitting
channels (banks and companies such as Western Union) for remittance
transfers is very limited in both Mozambique and Zimbabwe. SAMP’s 2006
Migration and Remittances Survey found that the vast majority of cash
remittances are couriered by hand (personal or friends), by taxi drivers and
by informal transport operators (Table 11).143 Informal channels were clearly more important in Mozambique at that time, with 87% of migrants utilizing such channels to send remittances to their home country. Around half of
Zimbabwean migrants used informal channels with a number preferring to
use formal channels such as the post office (14.5%) and banks in Zimbabwe
(23.5%). The subsequent economic collapse in Zimbabwe made it uneconomical for migrants to send money using formal channels. Money that
was sent using formal channels was converted into Zimbabwean dollars at a
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rate fixed by the country’s central bank, while the growing “black market”
kept pace with the country’s rapidly increasing inflation rate. This created
a market for the entry of informal transport operators called the Omalayisha
who operated largely from South Africa.144 These informal entrepreneurs
conducted their business in both directions, moving “cash, people – in good
health, ill health or as corpses – consumer and material goods to Zimbabwe,
and migrants to South Africa, a process that led to significant improvements
in household food security and standards of living.”145
Table 11: Remittance Channels Used by Mozambican and Zimbabwean Migrants in South Africa
Remittance channel

Mozambique (%)

Zimbabwe (%)

Formal
Via post office

0.8

14.5

Spouse’s TEBA account

1.7

1.5

Via bank in home country

0.5

23.5

Bank in South Africa

0.2

1.3

Via TEBA own account

4.2

0.6

Informal
Bring personally

43.0

34.6

Via friend/co-worker

35.9

11.0

Via taxis

3.8

2.8

Bus

4.3

0.1

Other method

5.5

9.8

Don’t know

0.0

0.2

Source: Pendleton et al.146

The remitting behaviour of informal sector mobile businesses and individuals is largely unknown, as is the role of remittances in building informal
entrepreneurship in Harare and Maputo. Other key unanswered questions
include: (a) how are the financial benefits of informal entrepreneurship
distributed between South Africa (local spend), and Zimbabwe and Mozambique (remittances)? (b) do demands for remittances by households for living expenses in Zimbabwe and Mozambique reduce the inclination to grow
and reinvest in South Africa? (c) could informal income in South Africa be
used to provide start-up capital for enterprises in Harare and Maputo? and
(d) how does informal remitting (which dominates the remitting behaviour
of migrants in general) compare with formal remitting in terms of costs and
benefits to informal economy entrepreneurs and micro-enterprises?
In the cases of Harare and Maputo, migrant entrepreneurs are primarily
citizens who use temporary migration to South Africa as a strategy to support their businesses in Zimbabwe and Mozambique. There are comparatively few foreign migrant entrepreneurs in these two cities. In South Africa,
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on the other hand, most migrant entrepreneurs are not citizens at all but
come from other African countries. The key question, then, is whether and
to what extent citizenship and its entitlements impact upon opportunities
and strategies for growing an informal enterprise. A third possibility, about
which little is known, is whether informal entrepreneurs operate businesses
that straddle two or more cities. Given the high levels of mobility between
Mozambique and Zimbabwe and South Africa this does seem likely. Particular attention needs to be given to straddling as a migrant business strategy.

Gender, mobility and entrePreneurshiP

G

ender issues are of particular relevance to understanding the nature
of informal enterprise in Southern African cities. Firstly, cross-border
migration has always been highly gendered in Southern Africa. For decades,
migration to South Africa from the rest of Africa was primarily the preserve
of young men. As recently as 2006, the overall gender breakdown of SADC
migrants was 86% male and 14% female.147 However, a process of feminization of migration is under way with the numbers and proportion of female
migrants to South Africa increasing rapidly.148 This process has proceeded
furthest in the case of Zimbabwe, where in 2006 as many as 44% of migrants
were women. Many migrant women are either spouses of male migrants
or heads of households. One reason for the feminization of migration is
changing gender roles within countries of origin especially where traditional
employers of male migrants, such as the South African mining industry,
have gone into decline. This has forced more women into cross-border
migration to South Africa where they can access low-wage employment.
Second, migrant women experience severe discrimination in urban
labour markets. Formal sector employment is difficult to obtain, even for
those with skills and education. Few economic sectors prefer to hire women
over men – domestic service is one, commercial agriculture another. Working conditions in both are poor with few rights and high levels of exploitation. Unable to obtain work permits, many women are hired as irregular
migrants, which heightens their vulnerability as they are deprived of legal
recourse when wages are unpaid or they are abused in the workplace. The
majority cannot obtain formal sector jobs at all and are forced into survivalist activities in the urban informal economy. The informal economy, particularly street trading, is dominated by women as a result.149
Third, in both Harare and Maputo, gender is a particularly significant
axis of differentiation and opportunity within the informal economy. In the
Harare of the 1990s, the majority of informal operations were owned and
run by women.150 The collapse of the formal economy pushed many more
men into the sector and made the highly competitive informal business
environment a site of new conflict.151 Similar gender-based tussles have
emerged within the informal economy of Maputo.152 Cross-border trade
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between Zimbabwe, Mozambique and South Africa was initially dominated
by women who were precluded from formal sector labour markets and used
the proceeds to sustain their households, independent of male household
heads.153 In the last decade, higher rates of unemployment amongst men
have prompted them to move into the trade, leading to growing gender
conflict over control of sectors of the trade as well as the disposition of the
proceeds of trade.
Fourth, migrant women face considerable challenges to entrepreneurship
and building successful enterprises.154 Some are internal and others external to the household. Patriarchal domination in the household is often an
obstacle to innovation, independent activity and control over the proceeds
of work. In addition, domestic responsibilities and entrenched gender roles
deprive women of the time, resources and energy to devote to revenuegenerating economic activity. Outside the household, women face exclusion
as migrants and from the resources needed to grow an informal business
successfully. On the other hand, migration can provide opportunity, freeing
women from the constraints of patriarchy and facilitating empowerment
through independent economic activity outside the direct control of male
household members.155
Finally, supposedly gender-neutral migration policies have been shown
to contain discriminatory provisions that penalize, and often criminalize,
the mobility and livelihood strategies of marginalized migrant women. This
has been particularly evident in the formulation and implementation of
national immigration policy.156 At the local level, municipal regulations and
policing of the informal economy impact most directly and negatively on
female entrepreneurs and traders who dominate this activity.157 What is less
clear is how municipal policies towards informal entrepreneurship enable or
constrain the ability of women to grow their businesses and contribute to
gender-sensitive inclusive growth. Women also face other non-economic
obstacles in the form of parasitical male police and customs officials who
control the corridors of movement.158
These gender-based issues can be reformulated as a set of key research
questions: (a) does the feminization of migration impact on the nature of
participation of women in the informal economy, are there gender differences in the types and opportunities for involvement of men and women
in informal entrepreneurship and does small business development offer
women (and especially women-headed households) a way out of urban poverty? (b) what kinds of gender-based challenges affect migrant female and
not male entrepreneurs and what strategies do they adopt to establish and
grow their businesses? (c) how do intra-household gender roles and expectations impact on the ability of women to establish and grow their informal
enterprises? and (d) are national and local policies on migration and the
informal economy disadvantageous to female entrepreneurs and what kinds
of policy reforms would mitigate this situation?
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miGrant entrePreneurial motivation

R

esearchers in other parts of the world have increasingly sought to document and understand the diverse motivations for informal entrepreneurship.159 A common, if simplistic, distinction is often made between survivalist or marginalist or involuntary participants in the informal economy
and those who choose informal over formal work because of the opportunities it provides. These two groups are often referred to as necessity-driven
and opportunity-driven entrepreneurs.160 The former have been described
as follows: “their contribution is negligible and expected returns are low
and intermittent, moreover they display low expectations of growth and job
creation, and their motivation is all about personal survival.”161 In Southern Africa, until recently, attention tended to focus more on the survivalist
activities and income-generating strategies of those in the informal economy. The underlying premise was that individuals in the informal sector were
struggling to earn a living in conditions of extreme difficulty and marginalization. However, the “marginalization thesis” has been tested and found
wanting in other contexts in Africa and there is no reason why it should be
uncritically applied to South Africa, Mozambique and Zimbabwe.162
Participation in the informal economy may be enforced, in the sense
that there are no alternatives, but that does not mean that all participants
are therefore just “getting by” until a better opportunity presents itself in
the formal economy. One psychological study of “necessity entrepreneurs”
in Johannesburg, for example, found that they displayed “cognitive styles
matching enterprising attitudes.”163 There is also considerable variability
amongst so-called survivalists. A three-year study of street traders in innercity Johannesburg, for example, found considerable variation in levels of
satisfaction and a very strong statistical relationship between “continuance
satisfaction” and levels of income.164 The same research also found considerable variation in the psychological value systems of individual traders.165
One of the most vexing questions for small business advocates in South
Africa is what is commonly seen as an underdeveloped entrepreneurial
motivation or “spirit” amongst those living in more disadvantaged areas
of the country.166 Some studies have contested this stereotype while others have sought explanations that are lodged in the repressive legacy of
apartheid and the dysfunctional South African education system.167 The
issue has been brought into sharp relief by South Africa’s poor ranking in
global entrepreneurship surveys and the relatively small size of the informal
economy.168 The perception that migrants are far more successful entrepreneurs than South Africans in the informal economy has prompted a new
research focus on migrant entrepreneurial orientation and motivation and,
by extension, comparisons with South African entrepreneurs.169 One study
of 500 SMMEs in the retail sector in Gauteng, however, found no significant
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difference between South Africans and migrants in terms of their motivation to start a business.170 Another study of the entrepreneurial orientation
of 339 South African (44%) and non-South African (56%) street traders
in inner-city Johannesburg found, to the obvious surprise of the authors,
that South Africans were more innovative than international migrants
(with migrants to Johannesburg from other parts of South Africa the most
innovative of all).171 However, South Africans were associated with lower
levels of the entrepreneurial qualities of “proactiveness” and “competitive
aggression” and, overall, South African nationality was “negatively and
significantly associated with total entrepreneurial orientation.”172 Competitive aggressiveness was also positively correlated with years spent in the city,
days worked per week, and degree of training.173 A third study focused on
the spaza shop sector in Khayelitsha, Cape Town.174 Of a total of 352 spaza
owners interviewed, 214 (61%) were South Africans and 138 (39%) were
international migrants. In both groups, the gender split was around 60%
male and 40% female. Migrants scored better than South Africans on four
separate indicators of entrepreneurial orientation: achievement, innovation, personal initiative and autonomy.
Other aspects of migrant entrepreneurial motivation have been examined in other case studies based on research in inner-city Johannesburg.
Fatoki, for example, analysed the “competitive intelligence” of migrantowned businesses in Johannesburg and found that competition information-seeking is performed by the majority of owners and their employees,
especially to monitor the prices of their competitors.175 This enables them
to undercut their competition and attract more customers. The study also
examined the growth expectations of migrant entrepreneurs and found a
high degree of optimism.176 Education, managerial experience, related experience, motivation and networking were all significant predictors of positive
growth expectations. At the firm level, innovation and adequate access to
finance were significant predictors of growth expectations.

PatholoGiZinG sPaCe, PoliCinG informality

T

he three countries (and four municipalities) discussed in this paper
represent contrasting policy responses to the informal economy and
informal migrant entrepreneurship. The predominant attitude towards the
informal economy in Zimbabwe and Harare over the last decade has been
extremely negative and repressive underwritten by a modernist view of city
planning and the pathologizing of informal urban space, which are totally at
odds with the reality of survival in a rapidly shrinking formal economy and
mass unemployment.177 These views culminated in the nationwide assault
on informality by the Mugabe government through Operation Murambatsvina (Clean Out the Trash) in 2005, which attempted to destroy all
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manifestations of urban informality: businesses, markets and shelter.178 The
UN Habitat mission to Zimbabwe estimated that some 700,000 people in
cities across the country lost either their homes, their source of livelihood
or both.179 Sites where informal economy workers gathered to market their
wares, as well as formal markets, some of which had been in operation for
decades, were targeted. An estimated 75,000 vendors in Harare alone were
unable to work from late May, 2005.180 The informal economy in cities like
Harare was, in fact, a consequence of government policies and, in particular,
the country’s growing economic crisis.181 With the collapse of the manufacturing base and commercial food production, the shelves in formal retail
outlets emptied, providing new opportunities for informal entrepreneurship.
Many moved to South Africa and countries overseas to procure goods unavailable locally for resale and opened up new markets for products made in
Zimbabwe, particularly in the handicraft industry.
Operation Murambatsvina temporarily devastated the informal economy
and the livelihoods of the urban poor in many Zimbabwean cities.182 However, this reactionary and retrograde policy appears to have been no more
than a temporary “fix” for its architects as informality quickly rebounded
and returned to the urban spaces from which it had been erased.183 The key
policy question in Zimbabwe is what the impact of the official harassment
has been on informal entrepreneurship and how informal entrepreneurs
have responded to this policy through strategies of avoidance, resistance
and flight. If Zimbabwe’s economic recovery gathers pace, it is important to
know whether the state will adopt a more tolerant approach to informality
or whether the vast informal economy will continue to “fly under the radar”
and be the target of renewed repression.
In Mozambique, and Maputo in particular, the national and municipal
authorities have traditionally adopted a tolerant approach to the informal
economy, primarily because it provides a livelihood to so many and because
of the social unrest likely to be generated by a Zimbabwe-style assault.184
Maputo has experienced food and fuel riots in recent years and any activity that lowers the cost of food is unlikely to be tampered with. While the
informal economy has been subject to periodic harassment, it is generally
viewed within official circles as an important and sustainable source of livelihood for the urban poor. However, as one study points out, the state is “not
universally tolerant of informal activities” and has “embraced a modernizing agenda, aimed at promoting formalization.”185 The policy aim is not to
eliminate informality but to “discourage” illegality through registration and
formalization. One mechanism has been the establishment of formal urban
markets where vendors pay rent for stands. However, many of these stands
remain unoccupied. As one commentator noted: “What they say in Maputo
is that there are thousands of spaces available in the legal official municipal
markets which are not being taken up. People don’t do this because if they
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move into the markets they will have to pay taxes. All these people would
prefer to sell their stuff on the pavements.”186
In 2008, a simplified tax for small businesses was introduced, payable as
a percentage of turnover or as a lump sum. Any company, individual trader
or producer with a volume of business less than about USD100,000 per year
could opt for this tax instead of paying income, corporation and value-added
taxes. However, uptake has been low.187 To date, informal entrepreneurs
have been largely resistant to such efforts, which are viewed as a “money
grab by the state.”188 The vast majority (80%) of firms in a 2005 survey had
no kind of documentation and were officially illegal.189 According to Byiers,
“it is important to understand why greater formalization might be desirable.
While the government tends to focus on raising revenues, where micro
informal firms are concerned, the benefit from formalization is more likely
to be the secondary effects of allowing enterprises to operate legitimately,
and thus potentially raising their productivity and ability to integrate more
deeply with the national economy.”190
There is some evidence that former informal operators who have registered and paid licences and taxes are more productive than those who spend
a great deal of effort evading the authorities, but the obstacles to formalization and why this might be avoided or resisted need further research, as do
the implications of formalization. Mozambique now has one of the fastest
growing formal economies in Africa and the streetscape of major cities such
as Maputo is being transformed. Policy pressures to formalize the informal
economy, a basic precept of the many international agencies and donors
that advise and provide resources for urban infrastructure, are likely to
intensify. Already one of Maputo’s major informal markets, Xikhelene, has
been “upgraded”, which has forced vendors to rent new stands and eliminated all associated trading on the streets around the market.191
The South African response to informality lies somewhere between the
Mozambican and Zimbabwean, but has been neither consistent nor coherent. Given the vigorous suppression of informality by the apartheid state,
it was likely that the country’s first democratic state would reinforce the
new policies of tolerance that emerged in the late 1980s. At the national
level, the post-apartheid state introduced a set of support programmes to
assist entrepreneurship development and upgrading of the small, medium
and microenterprise (SMME) economy. Rogerson’s review of the impacts
of the first 10 years of the post-apartheid government’s SMME programmes
concluded, however, that “existing government SMME programmes largely
have been biased towards the groups of small and medium-sized enterprises
and to a large extent have by-passed micro-enterprises and the informal
economy.”192 A detailed review of the efficacy of the South African government support measures to the informal economy during the post-apartheid
period concluded that they were “few and far between, patchy and inco41
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herent, and largely ineffective.”193 Another study demonstrates this has
particularly been true for female entrepreneurs.194
Although these evaluations need to be updated, there are indications
that very small economic players in the informal economy “continue to
fall through the gaps in government policy.”195 Two recent initiatives from
the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) illustrate the kinds of antiforeign thinking that inform the national government’s policy response. In
mid-March 2013, the DTI launched the National Informal Business Upliftment Strategy (NIBUS), the first nationally-coordinated policy approach
to dealing with the informal sector, which has led to the establishment of
the Shared Economic Infrastructure Facility (SEIF) and the Informal Business Upliftment Facility (IBUF) tackling infrastructure and skills deficits
respectively. SEIF provides funding for new, upgrades or maintenance of
infrastructure that is shared by informal businesses. Funding is available
to municipalities on a 50:50 cost-sharing grant basis to a maximum of
ZAR2 million. IBUF focuses on skills development, promotional material,
product improvement, technology support, equipment, and help with registration. This is being piloted through the training of 1,000 informal traders
in a partnership with the Wholesale and Retail Sector Education and Training Authority. The stated target of business upliftment is entrepreneurial
activity in the informal economy. This, combined with an emphasis on
graduation to the formal economy, runs the risk of “picking the winners”
and neglecting the majority. Policy at both national and local level needs
to recognize the diverse nature of informal activity and the fact that these
activities require support that is quite specific.
The final NIBUS document has yet to be released by the DTI. However,
the first two drafts express clear anti-foreign sentiment. The March 2013
draft, for example, states that “there are no regulatory restrictions in controlling the influx of foreigners, especially Chinese and Pakistanians; and it
seems there is no synergy between the DTI and Home Affairs in devising
strategies and policies to control foreign business activities.” The January
2014 draft adds that “this strategic pillar further attends to foreign trader
challenge as there is evidence of violence and unhappiness of local communities with regard to the takeover of local business by foreign nationals.
A number of foreign traders are also illegal in the country and some are
involved in the sale of illegal goods.”
The second development is the tabling in Parliament of the Licensing
of Businesses Bill in 2013 by the DTI. The Bill specifies that any person
involved in business activities – no matter how small – will be required to
have a licence. Members of the South African Police Service, traffic officers
and peace officers, amongst others, would be given powers to enforce compliance – to conduct inspections, question any person, remove any goods on
the premises and confiscate them and close any premises pending further
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investigation. Those found in contravention of the Act, once convicted
would be liable for a fine of an unspecified amount or imprisonment for up
to 10 years.196 The Bill is extremely punitive and would result in large-scale
criminalization of current livelihood activities. It was withdrawn for revision
after a chorus of protest from the private sector, non-governmental organizations, academics and the media.
The sections of the Bill referring to migrants are especially relevant. The
Bill states that licences will be only be given to non-citizens who have first
acquired a business permit under the Immigration Act or a refugee permit
under the Refugee Act.197 Business permits have to be applied for in the
country of origin and are only granted if the applicant can demonstrate
that he or she has ZAR2.5 million to invest in South Africa. Few, if any,
cross-border traders and migrant entrepreneurs currently operating in the
South African informal economy would qualify. The Bill also suggests that
community-based organizations, non-governmental organizations and others
will be given the job of working with the licensing authorities to police this.
The implication here is that South Africans could assist the police in identifying and “rooting out” foreign traders. The xenophobic attacks of 2008
demonstrated that there are elements in many communities who need no
encouragement to turn on their neighbours from other African countries.
This shows a strong anti-foreign sentiment within national government
with a focus on those operating in the informal economy. The Deputy Trade
and Industry Minister, for example, has stated that “the scourge of South
Africans in townships selling and renting their businesses to foreigners
unfortunately does not assist us as government in our efforts to support and
grow these informal businesses…You still find many spaza shops with African names, but when you go in to buy you find your Mohammeds and most
of them are not even registered.”198 Such sentiments are echoed within the
ruling African National Congress (ANC). The ANC National Executive
Committee stated just prior to the 2014 national elections that “arising from
issues raised on our door to door election campaign…it was decided that
an in-depth research be commissioned to look into the best way of dealing
with jobs particularly that do not require high level of skills that get taken
by foreign nationals, equally such an in-depth research should also look
into small trading impact by foreign nationals. It was agreed that once the
research has been completed and the report compiled, further discussion
will be undertaken with a view to refine our immigration policy.”199
At the local level, in both Cape Town and Johannesburg, there are contradictions between policy statements affirming the positive contribution of
the informal economy and the actual implementation of policy. Consider,
for example, a particularly visible element of the informal economy – street
trading. Johannesburg’s street trading policy states that “informal trading is
a positive development in the micro business sector as it contributes to the
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creation of jobs and alleviation of poverty and has the potential to expand
further the City’s economic base.”200 Cape Town’s policy advocates for
a “thriving informal trading sector that is valued and integrated into the
economic life, urban landscape and social activities within the City of Cape
Town.”201
Yet, in late 2013, the Johannesburg City Council violently removed and
confiscated the inventory of an estimated 6,000 inner-city street traders,
many of them migrants. A group of traders took the city to court and, in
April 2014, the Constitutional Court ruled in their favour with Acting Chief
Justice Moseneke stating that the so-called Operation Clean Sweep was an
act of “humiliation and degradation” and that the attitude of the City “may
well border on the cynical.”202 Street traders have returned to the streets
but their future remains uncertain. The City has commissioned a project to
consider alternatives while simultaneously pursuing the declaration of large
inner city areas restricted and prohibited trade zones.203 Wafer’s detailed
analysis shows how the city has long been ambivalent, if not actively hostile,
to the informal economy.204 Recent research on inner-city Cape Town suggests that there is less draconian but more systemic exclusion exemplified
by the allocation of only 410 street-trading bays in the whole inner city.205
There is evidence of ongoing harassment of traders throughout the city.206
Although the policy environment differs in different parts of the city and
between different segments within the informal economy, the modernist vision of the “world-class city” with its associated antipathy towards
informality and the pathologizing of informal space and activity seems to
predominate.
Some of the most dedicated, enterprising and successful entrepreneurs in
the South African informal economy are migrants to the country. Under any
other circumstances they would probably be lauded by government as exemplars of small-scale and micro entrepreneurship. However, the state (and
many citizens) view their activities as highly undesirable simply because
of their national origins. Harassment, extortion and bribery of officialdom
are some of the daily costs of doing business in South Africa. Many entrepreneurs, especially in informal settlements and townships, face constant
security threats and enjoy minimal protection from the police.207 Informal
cross-border traders face another set of obstacles.208 These include harassment by police and border guards, demands for inflated customs duties,
transportation problems for goods, personal safety and security, unfriendly
municipal regulations, and the difficulties of accessing credit. As a result
they are unable to utilize their entrepreneurial skills and experience and
grow their businesses in optimal fashion.
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ConClusion

I

n a recent discussion of the relationship between inclusive growth and
informality, Heintz defines inclusive growth as growth that occurs in a
context in which employment opportunities expand and improve, poor
households’ access to these opportunities increases, and inequalities are
decreased. He suggests a research agenda focused on four main issues:
and informality;
the informal economy, such as economic risk, transitions into and out of
informal employment, gender-based constraints, and enterprise upgrading;
employment; and
While there are several references to mobility in Heintz’s discussion,
this is generally confined to economic mobility and not spatial mobility
and the interactions between the economic and the spatial. For all its relevance, therefore, his proposed agenda overlooks a central characteristic
and determinant of informality – human mobility and migration – and the
ways in which it complicates the relationship between inclusive growth and
informality.
In an analysis of the relationship between migration and inclusive
growth in India, IDRC’s Arjan de Haan argues that migration and migrants
are largely invisible in policy debates.209 He draws a parallel between outdated conceptions of the informal economy and migration that see both as
transitional, noting that “as within the concept of informal sector, so with
migrants there is a risk that the assumption of transitional existence may
hinder creative thinking about ways in which migrants can be supported.”
Arguing that a strong anti-migrant bias pervades policy discussions, de
Haan states that “policy makers around the world tend to regard migrants as
vagrants, and perceive migration as a threat to stability, to social order, and/
or to national or regional identity.” In Southern Africa, global debates about
the positive aspects of the relationship between migration and development
have made limited headway.210 Instead, migration is viewed by politicians
and policy-makers alike as something to be resisted and controlled and
migrants themselves as threats, parasites, job-stealers and law-breakers. The
creative potential and possibilities of migrant entrepreneurship, whether
survivalist or opportunistic, are ignored and regulatory barriers are constantly created and reinforced. Ironically, migrant entrepreneurs in South Africa
from Zimbabwe, Mozambique and other African countries would be lauded
as economic innovators and exemplars, but for the fact that they carry the
labels “foreigner” and “outsider.”
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The backdrop for the Growing Informal Cities (GIC) Project’s focus
on informality and migrant entrepreneurship is regional integration, rapid
urbanization and the expansion of informal urban economies in the Southern African cities of Cape Town, Johannesburg, Maputo and Harare. With
high rates of formal unemployment in most countries, the informal economy
has emerged as a major source of income and livelihoods for poor urban
households. Migrants in and from all four cities play a critical role in the
informal economy yet the importance of that role is often underestimated
and invisible to researchers and policy-makers. Migrants may be more entrepreneurial than most, yet the constraints and obstacles they face in establishing and growing their businesses are massive. Their general contribution
to employment creation and inclusive growth is undervalued and often misrepresented as a threat, they face particular difficulties in accessing microfinance and the formal banking system, they are often excluded from SMME
training programmes and they frequently run afoul of badly-managed and
often corrupt systems of immigration and border control.
The purpose of the GIC is to examine and profile the “hidden” role of
migrant informal entrepreneurship in different Southern African cities. The
cities were chosen for analysis and comparison because they represent different forms of migrant entrepreneurship. In South African cities like Cape
Town and Johannesburg, migrant entrepreneurs come from throughout
Africa including Zimbabwe and Mozambique. In Maputo and Harare, most
migrant entrepreneurs are local but they structure their businesses around
the opportunities afforded by growing regional integration and cross-border
migration to and from South Africa. Policies towards informality and
informal entrepreneurship vary from country to country. In Zimbabwe, the
informal economy has been ruthlessly repressed but survives nonetheless. In
Mozambique, there is a laissez-faire attitude towards the informal economy
and attempts to formalize informal businesses through registration have
not been particularly successful. In South Africa, informality is generally
encouraged at the national level through training programmes and support
activities. But at the municipal level, the informal economy is often viewed
in negative terms and pathologized. The impacts of national and municipal
programmes and actions are uncertain especially for migrant entrepreneurs.
Indeed, these entrepreneurs, who could and do contribute to inclusive
growth, are subjected to social and economic exclusion that spills over into
xenophobia.
The GIC is generating a comparative body of knowledge about informal
migrant entrepreneurs, raising their profile in regional, national and municipal policy debates with a view to effecting positive change in the regulatory
environment in which they operate. By allowing migrant entrepreneurs to
expand and reach their full potential, free of harassment and exclusion, a
major contribution can be made to facilitating inclusive growth through
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informal entrepreneurship. To this end, GIC will advance understanding
of the reciprocal links between mobility and informal entrepreneurship in
Southern African cities through a programme of ongoing rigorous research
oriented to the economic growth and poverty reduction goals of SADC
governments, and impacting on policy implementation processes around
migration, development and urban management. The more specific objectives of GIC are:
malization in Southern African cities and examining the implications for
municipal, national and regional immigration and urban development
policy;
economy of particular cities (Cape Town and Johannesburg) and the role
of cross-border migration in the informal economy of others (Harare and
Maputo) and identifying the obstacles that migrant entrepreneurs face
in maximizing the growth and employment creation potential of their
businesses; and
mal entrepreneurship amongst migrants, including refugees and female
entrepreneurs.
In order to better understand the linkages between migration, informality and inclusive growth in Cape Town and Johannesburg , GIC is undertaking the following activities:
Town and Johannesburg in various sectors of the informal economy.
Information is being gathered on characteristics of the micro-enterprise
(including origins, ownership, structure, capitalization) activities (with a
particular emphasis on mobile marketing strategies), income generation,
employment creation potential, entrepreneurial orientation and performance in the informal economy;
enterprises, which will allow for comparative analysis of the make-up and
business strategies of South African versus migrant-owned enterprises in
the informal economy;
entrepreneurs to ascertain institutional and other problems faced in
growing businesses; and
ciations and policy-makers on attitudes towards regulation and support
of migrant entrepreneurs.
The GIC is also focusing on informal cross-border traders who use migration as a strategy to sustain and grow their businesses. Research includes:
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Harare and Maputo for information on participants, economic activities,
challenges, business strategies and migration behaviour;
traders with a focus on migration-related strategies to build and grow
informal businesses and attitudes towards policy regulation of their
activities;
Johannesburg; and
tor businesses, unions and traders’ associations on policy frameworks and
impacts on migrant entrepreneurship.
Finally, the GIC is examining national and municipal regulatory frameworks around informality and informal entrepreneurship with a focus on the
opportunities and obstacles that these frameworks pose to the establishment
and growth of migrant businesses including:
that affect informal migrant entrepreneurs in South Africa, Mozambique
and Zimbabwe;
of whether migrants and refugees have access to these programmes; and
cies and potential impacts of policies that could be used to grow informal
migrant businesses.
The results and policy implications of this programme of research will be
published in forthcoming reports in this special SAMP series.
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